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Abstract
Many legal scholars contend that Australia does not have a charter of 
rights in its Constitution. The legal scholar Rosalind Dixon, however, suggests 
that the Constitution does include some provisions that could be viewed as 
resembling a (partial) bill of rights. This constitutional framework might cause 
one to ponder whether human rights are adequately protected in the Australian 
constitutional system. This paper attempts to consider this question. It is argued 
that the protection of human rights under the Constitution, federal and state 
laws is not fully capable of responding to at least three human rights crises 
presented. Accordingly, the paper suggests that Australia should consider the 
idea of amending the Constitution in order to better human rights protection 
in the country. It offers suggestion that the Canadian model protection of 
human rights could be considered as one of the primary sources for reforms 
in the future.
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is frequently asserted that Australia is one of the few countries in the 
world that does not have a bill of rights in its constitution nor does it have 
Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
P-ISSN: 2460-0016 (print), E-ISSN: 2548-3870 (online)
https://doi.org/10.31078/consrev.523
* Lecturer in Law at the Faculty of Law, Universitas Gadjah Mada. The author wishes to thank Claire Kaylock, Vanessa 
Leak and the anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments on earlier drafts.  Any errors or shortcomings 
are my own.
Constitutional Change: Towards Better Human Rights Protection in Australia
249Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
an enumerated list of rights in its federal legislation.1 This assertion, however, 
has been described as an orthodox view given that Australia actually does have 
a sort of charter of rights which is quite narrow compared to international 
standards.2 Indeed, a recent comparison study has suggested that while the 
average number of Universal Declaration of Human Rights (‘UDHR’) provisions 
contained in constitutions around the world is thirty-five, there are only six 
provisions in the Australian Constitution that are similar to UDHR provisions.3 
As such, one might be forgiven to question whether the Australian Constitution 
provides adequate protection of human rights.
In the federal level, the Commonwealth Parliament adopted a new model 
of rights protection by enacting the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 
2011 (Cth).4 This statutory framework gives a greater role on the part of the 
Parliament through Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights (PJCHR) 
in ensuring the compatibility of Bills of Acts and legislative instruments with 
human rights.5 Before this, in 1986 the Parliament also established an Australian 
Human Rights Commission which is tasked to run several functions under anti-
discrimination and human rights laws established by the Parliament.6 In the 
state level, at least two state parliaments, the Australian Capital Territory (ACT) 
Legislative Assembly and the Victorian Parliament have decided to adopt the 
dialogue model in providing human rights protection by enacting the Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT)7 and the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities 
Act 2006 (Vic).8
1 See, for example, Robert French, “Protecting Human Rights Without a Bill of Rights,” The John Marshall Law 
Review 43, no. 3 (Spring 2010): 769; Michael Kirby, “Protecting Human Rights in Australia without a Charter,” 
Commonwealth Law Bulletin 37, no.2 (June 2011): 255; Susan Crennan, “Magna Carta, Common Law Values and 
the Constitution,” Melbourne University Law Review 39, no.1 (2015): 340.
2  Rosalind Dixon, “An Australian (Partial) Bill of Rights,” International Journal of Constitutional Law 14, no. 1 (Janu-
ary 2016): 81.
3  Colin J Beck et al, “Constitutions in World Society: A New Measure of Human Rights” (January 2017): 11, http://
dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2906946.
4  Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth).
5  Ibid.
6  “Functions of the Australian Human Rights Commission,” Australian Human Rights Commission, last accessed 
February 15, 2019, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/functions-australian-human-rights-commission.
7  Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
8  Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).
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This paper seeks to examine whether the Constitution along with the 
existing laws are effective in protecting human rights in Australia. It does this by 
first exploring the brief history of the formation of the Australian constitution 
which leads to narrow rights being expressed in the constitution as well as the 
emergence of implied rights in Part II. Afterward, it outlines the protection of 
human rights under federal and state laws before assessing the efficacy of rights 
protection performed by the PJCHR. In Part III, it explains why Australia needs 
a constitutional amendment to better its rights protection despite the fact that 
countries with bills of rights in their constitution are not necessarily more free 
than Australia. In Part IV, it suggests that Australia should adopt the Canadian 
model protection of human rights by extending the rights provisions in the 
Constitution. It is argued that doing so would serve as a stronger human rights 
protection mechanism.
II. HOW DOES RIGHTS PROTECTION WORK IN AUSTRALIA? 
2.1. Human Rights in Drafting the Constitution
In formulating the Australian Constitution that took place in successive 
conventions, it can be said that the founding fathers made considerable 
reference to the Constitution of the United States. 9 However, the influence of 
the American Constitution that bolster the desire to incorporate an extensive 
list of rights into the constitution did not receive a welcome reception 
from the leading colonial citizens.10 At the 1898 Melbourne Convention, for 
example, the proposal of the Attorney General for Tasmania, Andrew Inglis 
Clark, to guarantee equal protection before the law was rejected by votes 
of twenty-three to nineteen.11 It is believed that there were two primary 
considerations that led to the rejection of the proposal which was based 
on the Fourteenth Amendments of the US Constitution.12
9  Kirby, “Protecting Human Rights,” 264.
10  Ibid.
11  Ibid.
12  French, “Protecting Human Rights,” 771.
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First, there was a concern that the equal rights protection would affect 
the states’ legislative powers.13 The opposition of the proposal argued that 
the recognition of equal rights protection could potentially keep states from 
regulating the employment of Asian workers.14 In fact, more specifically, Isaac 
Isaacs, who later became the Chief Justice of the High Court of Australia, 
contested the anti-discrimination proposal on the footing that it would strike 
down laws that exclude Asian and African mining workers.15 As explained 
by Robert French, Former Chief Justice of High Court of Australia, during 
the making of the constitution and even long after the federation, Western 
Australian had racially biased immigration laws and other laws that kept 
persons with Asian and African descent from mining on a goldfield.16
Secondly, it was contended that such right protection was unnecessary 
to be inserted in the Australian Constitution.17 This was so because the 
Fourteenth Amendment occurred primarily to ensure that there would be 
no deprivation of African-American rights in the wake of the civil war.18 
From this line of thought, Australia would not have a civil war over racial 
matter such as that which occurred in the United States because there were 
not much people of colour in the country. Accordingly, the opponent of the 
equal rights protection proposal was definitive that there was no need to 
insert a provision forbidding discrimination against people on the ground 
of their race in Australia.19
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the other proposals in regard to certain 
rights advanced by Clark were successfully inserted into the final draft. Those 
are trial by jury (s80), the prohibition on the Commonwealth making laws 
in respect of religion (s116), and the protection of discrimination based on 
residence (s117).20 The insertion of such rights into the Constitution does not 
13  Ibid.
14  Ibid.
15  Kirby, “Protecting Human Rights,” 264.
16  Ibid.
17  French, “Protecting Human Rights,” 771.
18  Ibid.
19  Kirby, “Protecting Human Rights,” 264.
20  Jim McGinty, “A Human Rights Act for Australia,” The University of Notre Dame Australia Law Review 12 (Dec 
2010): 2.
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preclude the founding fathers from being criticised. Indeed, there has been 
a sharp criticism that the drafters of the constitution had an intention to 
discriminate and to disrespect human rights.21 The intention of the framers 
of the Constitution turned out to have adversely affected those who were 
seen as undesirable. At least two actions demonstrated this. 
First, the Constitution did not recognise the existence of Indigenous 
Australians and their citizenship.22 It was not until 1967 when the amendment 
of the constitution repealed the discriminatory clauses laid down in s51 xxvi 
and s127.23 Indeed, it was the decision of the High Court of Australia through 
Mabo vs Queensland that corrected the misinterpretation of the common law 
doctrine of terra nullius, which for a long time kept Indigenous Australians 
such as Merriam people from having legal entitlement to land.24  Through 
this decision, the Merriam people were declared entitled “as against the 
whole world to possession, occupation, use and enjoyment of the island”.25
Second, the Commonwealth Parliament, at the outset of its work, 
enacted the Immigration Restriction Act 1901 to place restrictions on 
immigration and to provide for the removal from the Commonwealth of 
prohibited immigrants.26 This legislation later became a precursor of the 
White Australia Policy, which imposed certain criteria to exclude non-white 
Europeans to migrate to Australia.27 While many, perhaps, did not want to 
admit that there was a racial prejudice in the policy, it was clear that the 
non-European policy allowed, for instance, immigration officers to interpret 
the true skin colour of those who might wish to migrate to Commonwealth 
of Australia.28 Based on this criterion, then, the immigration officers would 
determine whether the applicants are suitable to migrate. With respect to 
21  Ibid 3.
22  Ibid.
23  French, “Protecting Human Rights,” 774.
24  Barbara Hocking, “Aboriginal Law Does Now Run in Australia-Reflections on the Mabo Case: From Cooper v. 
Stuart through Milirrpum to Mabo,” Sydney Law Review 15 (1993): 205.
25  Mabo v Queensland (1992) 175 CLR 1.
26  Immigration Restriction Act 1901 (Cth).
27  McGinty, “A Human Rights,” 3.
28  NFSA Films, “Admission Impossible,” filmed in 1992 in Australia, video, 54:22, https://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=uPfJRetYP04.
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the Constitution, however, it does not only protect rights that are expressly 
stated, but also those that are not clearly outlined in the Constitution as 
will be explained briefly below.
2.2. Express and Implied Rights in the Constitution
2.2.1. Express Rights 
The express rights are the rights that are clearly stated in the Australian 
Constitution. These rights are extremely narrow, comprising of only three 
political and civil rights and two economic rights.29 Cheryl Saunders describes 
these constitutional rights as rights-type provisions because these clauses 
seem to place restrictions on the Commonwealth power as opposed to 
giving positive rights to individuals.30 With respect to the lack of rights 
recognition in the Constitution, George Williams suggests that this was 
the result of the framers of the Constitution being influenced by English 
legal scholars such as Dicey and Bryce who did not see the need to include 
rights in written constitutions.31
As previously stated, there are three political and civil rights enshrined 
in the Constitution. Firstly, trial by jury which is guaranteed in s80. More 
specifically, however, the guarantee only applies to ‘indictable’ offences 
under federal laws. 32 In other words, this section would not apply if the 
state legislation declared that an offense is not to be tried on indictment. 
Secondly, religious freedom as laid down in s116. Although this section 
forbids the Commonwealth Parliament from making laws that would 
establish a national religion or impedes individuals from exercising their 
religion or imposes any religious observance, this section does not apply 
to state laws either.33 In relation to s80 and s116, The High Court has also 
been criticised for interpreting the provision too narrowly. For example, in 
29 McGinty, “A Human Rights,” 6.
30  Cheryl Saunders, “The Australian Constitution and Our Rights,” in Future Justice (Sydney: Future Leaders, 2010), 
120.
31  French, “Protecting Human Rights,” 774.
32  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 121.
33  Ibid.
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Adelaide Company of Jehovah’s Witnesses Inc v Commonwealth, the High 
Court held that s116 allowed laws prohibiting advocacy detrimental to the 
prosecution of war by the Commonwealth.34 Thirdly, the right not to be 
discriminated based on state residence as stated in s117. This provision has 
been considered as worthy but not having a significant practical use due 
to the rarity of the discrimination.35
The economic rights in the constitution consist of some protection 
related to property rights (s51 xxxi) and the right to interstate trade (s92). 
While the former requires the Commonwealth authority to provide ‘just 
terms’ in the acquisition of property, the latter guarantees free market access 
between states.36 In contrast with the narrow interpretation of political and 
civil rights, the High Court has construed these provisions broadly, giving a 
wider operative space allowing economic rights to develop.37 For example, 
in Betfair Pty Limited v Western Australia, the High Court held that the 
amendments to the Betting Control Act, which placed new restrictions on 
Betfair were found to have contravened section 92 of the Constitution since, 
among other things, the prohibition of betting constituted a discriminatory 
burden on interstate trading.38 Moreover, in Minister of Army v Dalzie, the 
High Court appeared to have taken a wide view of the concept of property 
in interpreting s51 xxxi of the Constitution, as it took the view that property 
means “…any tangible or intangible thing which the law protects under the 
name of property”.39 
2.2.2. Implied Rights
Unlike express rights which are clearly set out in the Constitution, 
implied rights are the outcome of a judicial interpretation method namely 
‘implication from text and structure’.40 The implied rights can be divided into 
34  Adrienne Stone, “Australia’s Constitutional Rights and the Problem of Interpretive Disagreement,” Sydney Law 
Review 27, no. 1 (2005): 32.
35  McGinty, “A Human Rights,” 8.
36  Ibid.
37  Stone, “Australia’s Constitutional Rights,” 32.
38  Betfair Pty Limited v Western Australia (2008) 234 CLR 418.
39  Minister of Army v Dalziel (1944) 68 CLR 261.
40  Stone, “Australia’s Constitutional Rights,” 32.
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two categories. The first rights category is derived from the implication of the 
provisions establishing the Parliament and the Government.41 For instance, 
through a series of decisions in 30 years, the High Court has held in Lange 
v ABC42 that there exists an implied freedom of political communication.43 It 
has been established that the implied freedom of political communication 
was the source of the common law in order that federal and state laws 
adhere to it. Additionally, in Roach v Electoral Commissioner,44 the Court 
invalidated federal law provisions which purported to take away the rights 
of prisoners to vote. In making its judgment, the Court relied upon section 
24 that requires Members of the House of Representative to be directly 
elected by the people.45 
The second rights category is implied from the provisions that establish 
the power of the judiciary. The implied rights were conferred on individuals 
based on Chapter III of the Constitution which values the independence and 
the impartiality of the court.46 In several cases, the High Court has found 
that the Constitution provides some rights protection so as to ensure the 
integrity of the judicial system. In Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions,47 
for example, the court held that the NSW legislation regulating preventive 
detention was invalid on the basis that the state Parliament was prohibited 
under Chapter III of the Constitution to confer power on state courts.48    
Despite recognition of implied rights, some commentators have expressed 
concerns relating to the exercise of this judicial interpretation and the 
scope of the implied rights. The High Court has been accused of engaging 
in judicial activism and undermining the rule of law for continuingly 
discovering implied rights and striking down the social policy enacted by 
41  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 122.
42  Lange v Australian Broadcasting Corporation (1997) 189 CLR 520.
43  Kirby, “Protecting Human Rights,” 275.
44  Roach v Electoral Commissioner (2007) 233 CLR 162.
45  See s24 of the Australian Constitution.
46  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 123.
47  Kable v Director of Public Prosecutions (1996) 189 CLR 51.
48  McGinty, “A Human Rights,” 10.
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the democratic institution.49 On the contrary, there has been a concern on 
the extent to which the protection given to the implied rights is unclear.50 
One, for example, might question whether Australia protects freedom of 
speech and freedom of the press considering that there is no clear provision 
stating that in the Constitution. Nor is there a legal principle to refer in 
order to determine, for example, the limit of the speech that is permitted 
under the Constitution.  
2.3. Commonwealth Legislation Protection
It is probably fair to say that the rights protection under federal 
legislations is more certain and more applicable than the rights protected 
under the Constitution. Take, for example, the Racial Discrimination Act 
1975 (Cth) (RDA)51 upon which the High Court relied on to resolve issues 
in Mabo v Queensland.52 In this case, the court struck down the Queensland 
Coast Islands Declaratory Act 1985 (Qld) purporting to eliminate the native 
title of Murray Islanders due to its incompatibility with the RDA. Besides 
introducing anti-race discrimination law, the Commonwealth Parliament 
has also passed legislations that prohibit discrimination on the grounds of 
sex,53 disability54 and age.55
Moreover, through the Australian Human Rights Commission Act 1986 
(Cth), as the name suggests, an Australian Human Rights Commission has 
been established.56 Pursuant to the Australian Human Rights Commission 
Act 1986 (Cth) as well as anti-discrimination federal laws, the Commission 
is tasked with:
• investigating and conciliating complaints of discrimination or breaches 
of human rights;
49  James Allan, “The Three Rs of Recent Australian Judicial Activism: Roach, Rowe and (No)’Riginalism,” Melbourne 
University Law Review 36, no. 2 (2012): 777–782.
50  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 124.
51  Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth).
52  Mabo v Queensland (1988) 166 CLR 186.w
53  Sex Discrimination Act 1984 (Cth).
54  Disability Discrimination Act 1992 (Cth).
55  Age Discrimination Act 2004 (Cth).
56  History of the Commission, Australian Human Rights Commission, https://www.humanrights.gov.au/about/what-
are-human-rights/history-commission.
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• holding public inquiries into human rights issues of national importance 
and making recommendations to address discrimination and breaches 
of human rights;
• developing human rights education programs and resources for schools, 
workplaces and the community;
• providing independent legal advice to assist courts in cases that involve 
human rights principles;
• providing advice and submissions to parliaments and governments to 
develop laws, policies and programs consistent with existing national 
laws and international human rights agreements;
• undertaking and coordinating research into human rights and 
discrimination issues.57
The rights protection under Commonwealth statutory has been 
described as more straightforward.58 This is so because the Commonwealth 
Parliament has given legal recognition of the rights that can be effectively 
enforced throughout the country.59 Such protection, nevertheless, is still 
being criticised for covering limited rights.60 Furthermore, the limited power 
conferred upon the Australian Human Rights Commission indicates that the 
Commission would be incapable of providing effective remedies if human 
rights were breached by the Commonwealth power.61
2.4. State and Territory Rights Protection 
The statutory protection of human rights has been initiated in ACT 
and the State of Victoria (‘Victoria’) with the inspiration from the United 
Kingdom’s ‘dialogue model’.62 In ACT, the Legislative Assembly passed the 
Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT), which does not only recognise civil and 
political rights, but also respects economic, social, and cultural rights. In 
57  “Functions of the Australian.”
58  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 125.
59  Ibid.
60  McGinty, “A Human Rights,” 12.
61  Ibid 15.
62  Robert French and others, “Human Rights Protection in Australia and the United Kingdom: Contrasts and 
Comparisons,” Brief 42, no. 2 (2015): 24.
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the last regard, they are translated into the right to education.63 Similarly, 
but not exactly, the Victorian Parliament enacted the Charter of Human 
Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic), giving statutory recognition to 
various civil and political rights.64 Considering the reluctant attitude towards 
the notion of establishing a bill of rights by way of Constitution or federal 
legislation, the adoption of these human rights acts has been regarded as 
an achievement.65
Both of those acts require a new bill to be accompanied by a statement 
of compatibility. If a bill were found to be incompatible with human rights, 
the extent to which the incompatibility of the bill with human rights 
should be outlined.66 Irrespective of such requirement, the declaration of 
incompatibility does not impact on the validity and operation of the law.67 
It is also worthy to note that the Victorian Charter has given power to the 
Supreme Court of Victoria to interpret legislation in accordance with human 
rights as well as declaring whether legislation is inconsistent with human 
rights although it does not have an authority to strike down the law.68
In terms of the advantages of this type of rights protection, several 
observations are worth pointing out. Firstly, unlike the other federal, 
state and territory legislations which offer limited rights protection, the 
model adopted by the ACT and Victoria has enumerated an extensive list 
of protected rights.69 Secondly, it is not at odds with the supremacy of 
Parliament. Rather, it aims to bring about consistency between legislative 
or executive action and fundamental human rights by fostering dialogue 
between arms of governments.70 Finally, and perhaps most importantly, 
63  Part 3A of the Human Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
64  Part 2 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (Vic).
65  See, for example, Helen Watchirs and Gabrielle McKinnon, “Five Years’ Experience of the Human Rights Act 
2004 (ACT): Insights for Human Rights Protection in Australia,” University of New South Wales Law Journal 33(1) 
(2010): 136; Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 133.
66  See s28 and s29 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC); s32 and s33 of the Human 
Rights Act 2004 (ACT).
67  Ibid.
68  See s32 and s36 of the Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act 2006 (VIC).
69  McGinty, “A Human Rights,” 13.
70  George Williams, “The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Origins and Scope,” Melbourne 
University Law Review 30, no. 3 (2006): 901.
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this dialogue model of human rights protection puts a great stress on 
ensuring that the human rights principles are taken into consideration at 
the beginning of the legal and policy making processes.71
The rights protection model introduced in ACT and Victoria has also 
obtained various responses. There is, for instance, one recommendation to 
improve the statutes by expressly stating non-derogable rights such as the 
right against torture in the Act.72 Other has criticised the establishment of 
human rights acts for it would give a greater role on the part of unelected 
lawyers and unelected judges in public policy making.73 More importantly, 
the High Court has delivered a decision in Momcilovic v The Queen,74 in 
which it addressed the question of whether the involvement of a court in 
rights protection under the dialogue model is consistent with the principle 
of separation of powers.75 
The majority of the court held that the power of a state court to 
interpret legislation in accordance with human rights as laid out in s32 
of the Victorian Charter was valid.76 Although the majority of the court 
also ruled that the power conferred upon a state court to declare the 
incompatibility of legislation as laid out in s36 was valid, it held that such 
power was not within the exercise of the judiciary.77 This was so due to the 
characteristic of such declaration which is resembling an advisory opinion 
and non-binding in nature.78 Interestingly, the ruling of the court has also 
come to be viewed as the High Court’s suggestion that the dialogue model 
of human rights in Victoria cannot be applied at the federal level.79 It is 
71  Ibid 903.
72  Watchirs and McKinnon, “Five Years,” 170.
73  James Allan, “The Victorian Charter of Human Rights and Responsibilities: Exegesis and Criticism,” Melbourne 
University Law Review 30, no. 3 (2006): 921–922.
74  Momcilovic v The Queen (2011) 245 CLR 1 (‘Momcilovic’).
75  George Williams and Lisa Burton, “Australia’s Exclusive Parliamentary Model of Rights Protection,” Statute Law 
Review 34, no. 1 (2013): 89.
76  Ibid.
77  Ibid., 89–90.
78  Ibid.
79 Helen Irving, “The High Court of Australia Kills Dialogue Model of Human Rights,” The Australian, September 
16, 2011, http://www.theaustralian.com.au/business/legal-affairs/high-court-kills-dialogue-model-of-human-rights/
news-story/4aad1e8e57fb5cdd7ba265a64c540f50.
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believed that adopting the dialogue model at the federal level would breach 
the separation of powers.80
2.5. Rights Protection Under the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) 
Act 2011
The adoption of Victorian Charter and Human Rights Act in Victoria 
and ACT has encouraged other governmental entities to inquire as to 
whether they should do likewise.81 In fact, the Federal Government began 
to grapple with the question of how human rights in Australia should be 
protected.82 As a result, an Australian National Human Rights Consultation 
Committee was established in order to investigate the adequacy of human 
rights protection at the national level and find measures to better the current 
system.83 After conducting the federal inquiry for a year, the Committee 
recommended in its report, among other things, that Australia should adopt 
the dialogue model of human rights protection, which had been earlier 
introduced in ACT and Victoria.84
The Government, however, rejected the recommendation and instead 
proposed a somewhat different model which was called ‘Australia’s Human 
Rights Framework’.85 It excluded the insertion of a charter of rights into 
the proposed legislation because there was a concern that that would be 
politically divisive.86 In 2011, the Commonwealth Parliament passed the 
proposed legislation. Therefore, the Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) 
Act 2011 (Cth) (‘HRPS Act’) came into force. It is worthy to note two 
distinctive features of rights protection model under the legislation. First, 
the statute established the Parliamentary Joint Committee on Human Rights 
(‘PJCHR’) tasked to examine and report the compatibility of a proposed 
legislation and legislative instruments with human rights.87 Secondly, the 
80  Fiona Chong, “Human rights vs the High Court: how far can a Charter go?” Analysis & Policy Observatory, No-
vember 23, 2011, http://apo.org.au/node/27269.
81  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 133.
82  Ibid.
83  Ibid.
84  French and others, “Human Rights Protection,” 2.
85  Ibid.
86  Williams and Burton, “Australia’s Exclusive,” 71.
87  Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) s7.
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HRPS Act also requires a proposed legislation and legislative instruments 
to be accompanied by a statement of compatibility (‘SOC’).88 Nevertheless, 
there would be no effect on the validity and the enforceability of the 
legislation if the requirement were not met.89
The Australia’s Human Rights Framework is a unique model of rights 
protection. It can be assumed that this current framework is similar to the 
UK’s model that has been adopted in ACT and Victoria. But this assumption 
is not completely true because the Australia’s model does not give the 
role to the courts to interpret legislation in accordance with human rights 
nor to make a declaration of incompatibility such as in the UK.90 Another 
exceptional element from this ‘exclusive parliamentary model’ is that there 
is not an extensive list of rights outlined in the statutory framework.91 The 
statute instead defines human rights as ‘the rights and freedoms recognised 
and declared by’ one of the seven international treaties to which Australia 
is a party.92 Despite this, the HRPS Act has been referred to as a welcome 
development as it confirms the commitment of the Commonwealth to 
comply with its international obligation.93
With respect to the effectiveness of the exclusive parliamentary model 
drawing from the statutory framework, some commentators doubt that 
the current model would bring about strong protection regime of human 
rights. George Williams and Lisa Burton, for instance, point out at least 
two pertinent concerns. The first concern relates to the way in which rights 
defined in the HRPS Act.94 It has been suggested that the absence of an 
enumerated list of rights against which the SOC is examined, will likely 
to affect the clarity of analysis made by the PJCHR.95 The second concern 
is associated with the lack of legal consequence if Parliamentarians do not 
88  Ibid., 8.
89  Ibid., 8-9.
90  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 131.
91  Williams and Burton, “Australia’s Exclusive,” 59–60.
92  Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth), s3(1).
93  Dan R Meagher, “The Human Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act 2011 (Cth) and the Courts,” Federal Law Review 
42, no. 1 (2014): 24.
94  Williams and Burton, “Australia’s Exclusive,” 88.
95  Ibid.
Constitutional Change: Towards Better Human Rights Protection in Australia
262 Constitutional Review, Volume 5, Number 2, December 2019
comply with the requirement to pass a bill with a SOC nor consider the 
PJCHR’s report.96 Further, they opine that even if these two problematic 
features have been addressed, there is no guarantee that the Parliament 
will abide by the scrutiny regime in view of the absence of independent 
judicial supervision.97
Additionally, there have been attempts to assess the operation of the 
exclusive parliamentary model. One study found that the Parliamentarians 
and the Government Officials have failed to fulfil their obligation adequately.98 
In part this is due to the lack of rights literacy of government departments 
and in part because of no sanctions provided for failing to comply with the 
HRPS Act.99  In a more recent study, a more comprehensive approach has 
been conducted to evaluate the operation and the impact of the current 
rights protection regime in the span of four years since its operation.100 One 
of the key findings was that almost three-fourths of the PJCHR’s reports, 
which indicated that proposed legislations were potentially incompatible with 
human rights, did not have any effect at all to the outcome of the proposed 
legislations.101 This was so mainly because of the delay of the PJCHR’s report 
being delivered.102 Further, it reinforced the need for judicial involvement 
in the current regime to supervise the compliance of the branches of the 
government with their responsibility.103
III. THE NEED FOR CONSTITUTIONAL AMENDMENT
It has been explained that the Constitution only provides very limited rights 
protection in the forms of express rights and implied rights. But introducing 
broader rights by way of either constitutional change or federal legislation may 
96  Ibid., 90.
97  Ibid., 91–92.
98  Shawn Rajanayagam, “Does Parliament Do Enough: Evaluating Statements of Compatibility under the Human 
Rights (Parliamentary Scrutiny) Act,” University New South Wales Law Journal 38, no. 3 (2015): 1046.
99  Ibid., 1076–1077.
100  George Williams and Daniel Reynolds, “The Operation and Impact of Australia’s Parliamentary Scrutiny Regime 
for Human Rights,” Monash University Law Review 41, no. 2 (2016): 469.
101  Ibid., 490.
102  Ibid.
103  Ibid., 507.
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be difficult to achieve because of the Australian political and legal culture that 
seems somewhat antagonistic towards the notion of a bill of rights. Indeed, history 
shows that the attempts to incorporate human rights into the constitution and 
the federal legislation have failed several times. In fact, an attempt to extend 
the existing rights in the Constitution such as freedom of religion, trial by 
jury and just terms of property acquisition was overwhelmingly rejected in the 
1988 Australian referendum.104 This was so because a constitutional change is 
notoriously difficult to achieve due to s128 of the Constitution which requires a 
double majority of states and the people.105 In addition, the efforts to introduce 
a charter of human rights through federal legislation seemed to always lead to 
the similar outcome. Two initiatives to make legislations by reference to the 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights gained strong resistance 
from several states.106    
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the need for better human rights protection 
in Australia persists. At least, three major rights issues are worth pointing out. 
First, there has been a growing number of legislations passed by the Parliament 
that infringe basic freedoms. In a survey identifying current federal and state 
laws, George Williams found that, up to 2015, there were 350 instances of laws 
that arguably encroach on essential rights and freedoms in a healthy democracy, 
209 of which have been made since the terrorist attack in September 2001.107 
To take one example, as shown by George Williams, s 35P of the ASIO Act 
makes it possible to imprison journalists up to 10 years for writing a story on 
special intelligence operation even if it is done for public interest.108 This, in 
turn, reinforces the inadequacy of the exclusive parliament model in preventing 
the Parliament from producing laws that are incompatible with human rights. 
Secondly, Australia has been heavily criticised for its tough detention policy 
for refugees and asylum seekers who fled conflict, persecution or violence by 
104  French and others, “Human Rights Protection,” 24.
105  Kirby, “Protecting Human Rights,” 266.
106  Ibid.,  265–266.
107  George Williams, “The Legal Assault on Australian Democracy,” Queensland University of Technology Law Review 
16, no. 2 (2016): 37–40.
108  Ibid.,  38.
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boat109 despite some developments such as a dramatic decline of children being 
detained110 and a transition from indefinite detention to open centre.111 While 
it is true that the strong protection border policy have effectively prevented 
trafficking, people smuggling and even potential terrorist attacks in the future, 
it should be maintained that genuine asylum seekers running away from 
persecutions, death threats and wars in their home country should be treated 
with dignity. As Thomas Albrecht, UNHCR’s Regional Representative in Canberra, 
Australia once stated “Seeking asylum is not ‘illegal’. Refugees need and deserve 
protection and respect. The basic human right of every person to seek asylum 
from persecution is not diminished by their mode of arrival.”112
Finally, and equally important, there is a need to entrench a non-
discrimination clause into the constitution in order to provide full recognition 
and rights to the Australian first people. Such need stems from stark inequality 
between Indigenous Australians and non-Indigenous Australians. Historically, 
there was a trajectory of legal policy that arguably aimed to entrench the 
inequality.113 As illustrated by Megan Davis, through five historical periods 
(frontier, protection, self-determination, practical reconciliation, and new 
paternalism), the legal framework at constitutional, federal and policy levels 
have resulted in deep inequality in the present day.114 As Indigenous peoples see 
it, by inserting a constitutional provision on racial non-discrimination clause 
would, at least, serve as an integral part of recognising the their rights.115
In a public lecture, an Australian legal academic, Hilary Charlesworth 
explained that the Australian great reluctance in providing a comprehensive 
109  “Australia asylum: UN Criticises ‘Cruel’ Conditions on Nauru,” BBC News, November 18, 2016, http://www.bbc.
com/news/world-australia-38022204.
110  Australian Human Rights Commission, “Asylum Seekers, Refugees and Human Rights,” Snapshot Report 2nd 
Edition (2017), 14.
111  Ibid., 35.
112  UNHCR Regional Representation in Canberra, “Refugees Need and Deserve Protection and Respect,” UNHCR, 
October 31, 2016, https://www.unhcr.org/news/press/2016/10/5817bf3b4/refugees-need-and-deserve-protection-
and-respect.html.
113  Megan Davis, “Closing the Gap in Indigenous Disadvantage: A Trajectory of Indigenous Inequality in Australia,” 
Georgetown Journal of International Affairs 16 (2015): 35-41.
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human rights protection was based upon two underlying reasons.116 First, there 
has been a deep concern particularly in 1970s that the guarantee of human rights 
would restrain the power of states legislatures. This concern seems to have 
prevailed in several states such as New South Wales where the Parliamentary 
Committee declined not to address the systemic defect of rights protection due 
to parliamentary sovereignty in 2001.117 Secondly, there has been a profound 
belief that the Parliament is the right institution for protecting rights. It follows 
that conferring such authority upon the court would undermine the Australian 
democracy. This has been accompanied with scepticism that judges will more 
likely to be seduced to seize more power by using their moral understanding 
rather than their legal expertise in making decisions concerning human rights.118
The objections above, however, are not wholly valid. Although it is true that 
introducing a bill of rights in federal and sub-national jurisdictions may affect 
the legislative power, such as in ACT and Victoria, the notion of Parliamentary 
sovereignty seems rather odd. The Constitution binds both Commonwealth 
and States Parliaments. Their powers are either expressly or impliedly limited, 
thereby, they are not sovereign in any event.119 With regards to the Parliament 
as the best protector of rights, this contention is indefensible due to the fact 
that, the exclusive parliamentary model under the HRPS Act has not adequately 
restrained the responsible government from making laws that infringe human 
rights as I have demonstrated. Further, the view of describing an introduction 
of a bill of rights in the constitution as anti-democratic is rather old-fashioned 
because there already exists a partial bill of rights in the Constitution which is 
just extremely narrow.120 Also, the scepticism put forward by the opponent of 
the bill of rights is difficult to sustain as the High Court has been very cautious 
in construing the constitutional right provisions. This is so because, as Rosalind 
Dixon has argued, for most of Australian history, a majority of justices of the 
116  Hilary Charlesworth, “The Australian experiment with human rights charters,” Law Library of Victoria Public 
Lecture, September 21, 2016, https://www.lawlibrary.vic.gov.au/file/385/download?token=4DCbUnHA>.
117  Kirby, “Protecting Human Rights,” 266–267.
118  Charlesworth, “The Australian Experiment,” 8.
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High Court has been strongly committed to a form of legal conservatism, which 
places strong emphasis on formal legal materials and arguments.121  
Another objection which could be raised to the idea of amending the 
Constitution to extend rights provisions comes from a view that holds that 
countries that have a list of extensive rights in their Constitution are not 
necessarily freer than those who do not such as Australia. As mentioned at 
the outset, the Australian Constitution has only six provisions in the Australian 
Constitution that are similar to UDHR provisions. Meanwhile, its neighbouring 
country such as Indonesia has adopted a long list of human rights under Article 
28A-J in its Constitution that Tim Lindsey describes as ‘lengthy and impressive, 
granting full range of protections extending well beyond those guaranteed in 
most developed states’.122 This long list of rights, however, does not guarantee 
the rights protection of members of religious, ethnic and sexual minority groups 
who have often been subject to discrimination and persecution.123 Therefore, it 
should be acknowledged that countries with list of rights provisions in their 
Constitution does not necessarily guarantee the protection of basic freedoms 
and human rights in practice.
It is, however, important to note that inserting rights provisions into 
the Constitution would grant legal protection to those who have or will be 
suffered from rights violation even if they are unable to access to justice and 
have their voice heard. By including freedom of speech and freedom of the 
press in the Constitution, for example, would protect individuals from the 
encroachment of the state on their rights to speech and to make a news story, 
which are healthy in a democratic society. This does not mean that every right 
listed in international human rights treaties should be listed in the Australian 
Constitution. Human rights, at best, should be seen as moral rights, or to use 
121  Ibid., 95.
122  Tim Lindsey, “Indonesia: devaluing Asian values, rewriting rule of law,” in Asian Discourses of Rule of Law, ed. 
Randall Peerenboom (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004): 301.
123  See, for example, Melissa Crouch, “Regulating Places of Worship in Indonesia: Upholding Freedom of Religion 
for Religious Minorities?,” Singapore Journal of Legal Studies 96 (2007); Melissa Crouch, “Judicial Review and 
Religious Freedom: The Case of Indonesian Ahmadis,” Sydney Law Review 34 (2012);  Eleni Polymenopoulou, 
“LGBTI Rights in Indonesia: A Human Rights Perspective,” Asia Pacific Journal on Human Rights and The Law 19 
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the word of Amartya Sen, articulations of social ethics, comparable to-but very 
different from-utilitarian ethics.124 Whilst it is acknowledged that the ways of 
advancing the ethics of human rights need not be confined only to making new 
laws,125 or in this case extending rights protected by the Constitution, as I have 
argued above, the current legal framework under the Constitution, federal and 
state laws does not seem adequate in protecting universal human rights. Thus, 
Australia would be well-advised to make an amendment to the Constitution so 
as to provide a better human rights protection.
IV. ADOPTING CANADIAN MODEL OF RIGHTS PROTECTION
It is now convenient to consider what aspects of the Canadian’s right 
protection model should be adopted by Australia. Before doing so, it is required 
to explain the reasons why the Canadian model is relevant to be applied in 
Australia. First, unlike the UK and New Zealand which share a unitary state, 
Australia and Canada adopt federalism. The federal principle suggests that if a 
national bill of rights were to be introduced, this right protection model should 
be applied equally to both the Commonwealth and the States.126 Secondly, 
Australia and Canada are both countries that have a written constitution which 
is difficult to amend. The Constitution outlines specific principles upon which 
the way the rights protection designed should be based. Finally, in Momcilovic, 
the High Court has reduced the opportunity for dialogue model to be applied 
at the Federal level. It held that a declaration of incompatibility which is one 
of the distinct features of the dialogue model was not an exercise of judicial 
power. As Robert French observed:
In any event, in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction, this Court cannot 
interfere with such a declaration. A declaration of inconsistent interpretation, 
being non-judicial and not incidental to judicial power, cannot be 
characterised as a judgment, decree, order or sentence of the Supreme Court 
falling within the appellate jurisdiction conferred upon this Court by s 73 
of the Constitution.127
124  Amartya Sen, “Human Rights and the Limits of the Law,” Cardozo Law Review 27 (2006): 2916.
125  Ibid., 2919.
126  Cheryl Saunders, “Protecting Rights in the Australian Federation,” Adelaide Law Review 25 (2004): 207.
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In my own view, there are at least several components that are worth 
considering to be adopted by Australia. First, an entrenched bill of rights in the 
Constitution. In 1982, Canada adopted a Charter of Rights and Freedoms after 
experimenting with a national bill of rights in 1962 which was widely considered 
to be ineffectual.128 The Charter guarantees various rights and freedoms including 
fundamental freedoms, democratic rights, mobility rights, legal rights, equality 
rights, and language rights,129 which are arguably similar to civil and political 
rights. As to the type of rights that might be incorporated into the Australian 
Constitution, I would suggest civil and political rights comparable to those 
listed in the ICCPR. In addition, prohibiting discrimination on the basis of 
gender and sexual preference in all circumstances would be a major advance 
for universal human rights. 
Secondly, and equally important, a full recognition of status and rights of the 
Indigenous people. In s35 of the Charter, the status and rights of the Aboriginal 
people in Canada is expressly recognised.130 Additionally, the Prime Minister of 
Canada is required to hear the representative of the Aboriginal people in the 
process of amending the constitution.131 Australia can adopt these provisions to 
some extent in order to close the inequality gap between Indigenous Australians 
and non-Indigenous Australians. It has been shown that throughout history 
the Australian legal frameworks have perpetuated the inequality suffered by 
the Indigenous people.132 As such, the constitutional recognition of status and 
rights of the first Australian peoples would be a major breakthrough.
Thirdly, the notwithstanding clause which allows the legislation to override 
the constitutional rights for a five-year period.133 In Canada, this particular clause 
can be triggered by the Parliament as well as the legislature of the province 
by making a declaration that the legislation overrides protected rights in the 
Charter. This clause appears to seek an appropriate balance between the rights 
128  Saunders, “The Australian Constitution,” 130.
129  The Constitution Act 1982 being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982 (UK), 1982, c 11-part I.
130  The Constitution Act 1982, s35.
131  Ibid.
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protection and the Parliament authority. In the Australian context, the notion 
of the notwithstanding clause would be relevant to consider if there were an 
initiative to extend broader rights in the Constitution. This is so mainly because 
there is a strong opposition against judicial review on the basis of parliamentary 
sovereignty that has gained popularity.134 Although judicial review has been 
exercised for a century,135 meaning that such opposition does not seem to be 
a pertinent issue, adopting the notwithstanding clause would reconcile the 
authority of Parliament and the need for judicial review of laws that infringe 
the rights protected in the Constitution.
V. CONCLUSION
Australia has been widely known as one of the founding members of the 
United Nations. Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights was adopted 
when Dr Herbert Vere Evatt, a former judge of the High Court became the 
President of the United Nations General Assembly.136 It is not surprising then 
that Australia has also ratified a number of important international treaties 
concerning human rights. But nevertheless, when it comes to the domestic rights 
protection, it does not seem to be in harmony with international standards. 
As this paper has suggested, while a bill of rights has been adopted in some 
States, it is difficult to sustain that the current protection regime under the 
Constitution, Federal laws, and the HRPS Act is effective in safeguarding human 
rights. 
In many cases, there is a real need for extending the rights protected by the 
Constitution. It is also acknowledged that constitutional change is notoriously 
difficult. But it would not be impossible to achieve if the wider public came to 
grips with a view that the Constitution and the HRPA Act provide very limited 
rights protection, leaving vulnerable peoples at risk of human rights abuses 
without any significant remedies. Moreover, it is argued that instead of opting 
134  Jeremy Waldron, “The Core of the Case against Judicial Review,” Yale Law Journal 115(6) (2006).
135  Adrienne Stone, “Disagreement and an Australian Bill of Rights,” Melbourne University Law Review 26, no. 2 
(2002): 495-496.
136  Australia and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Australian Human Rights Commission, https://www.
humanrights.gov.au/publications/australia-and-universal-declaration-human-rights.
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for dialogue model, Australia should adopt the Canadian’s right protection 
model. Some elements that are worth considering include an entrenched bill 
of rights, a recognition of the first Australians people and their rights, and the 
notwithstanding clause. Not only will it provide a more effective framework 
for safeguarding human rights, but it will also strike a balance between the 
judiciary and the legislature.
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